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SEARCHING INSIDE GOOGLE: CASES,
CONTROVERSIES AND THE FUTURE OF THE
WORLD’S MOST PROVOCATIVE COMPANY
By Professor Jon M. Garon*
For a company whose motto is “Don’t be evil,” Google certainly has
its share of detractors. The company is at the center of numerous controversies that will determine how people use the Internet, find information, and
communicate with each other. The past year has involved both business
launches and legal decisions that will reshape Google’s future, alter the online environment, and potentially revise copyright and trademark law, including: the marketing of trademarks in online search, the proposed Book
Search settlement, the Viacom v. YouTube copyright infringement case, and
looming antitrust investigations. The article explores the future of Google
as it consolidates its control over online search and advertising and expands
into telecommunications, mobile devices and cloud computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Google has grown to become the largest U.S. advertising company
and a supplier of a wide array of software products.1 As this corporate behemoth reaches its teen years, the time has come to see how it is growing to
meet its corporate goals and how the advertising giant affects the world it
bestrides.

* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law; J.D. Columbia University School
of Law 1988. Prior versions of the article were prepared for the 2009 Midwest IP Institute and
the 2010 Committee of Cyberspace Law of the ABA Business Law Section, Winter Working
Meeting. I would like to thank Susan Stephan for her insights and comments on this project and
Stacy Blumberg Garon for her help and support.
1. Natalie Zmuda, E-tailers Seek Revenue Boost From Ads That May Even Tout Rivals,
ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 8, 2010, available at http://adage.com/digital/article?article_id=142652
(“Google is the largest seller of text ads through its AdSense program (that also includes display
ads), which collectively generated $5.2 billion in revenue for publishers in 2009.”); Mike Swift,
Google’s Stated List of Competitors Grows From Two to 10, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 13, 2010
(“Americans use Google for about two-thirds of U.S. searches, and the company has more than
70 percent of U.S. search advertising revenue, and about 90 percent in Europe⎯say the expanded
list of competitors is an attempt by Google to paper over its dominance.”).

429

430

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:429

“Don’t be evil.”2 As Google explains to its employees, the phrase is
“about providing our users unbiased access to information, focusing on
their needs and giving them the best products . . . [b]ut it’s also about doing
the right thing more generally—following the law, acting honorably and
treating each other with respect.”3 The company tells its employees to pay
attention to these issues.4 At the same time, however, regulators and critics
around the globe are beginning to question the ability of Google to stay true
to this mission.5 This review hopes to take the admonition seriously:
“[D]on’t be evil, and if you see something that you think isn’t right—speak
up!”6
II. THE GOOGLE CORE
Google is an advertising company that primarily uses its patented
page ranking technology, named PageRank, to sell advertising.7 The PageRank technology was created by company founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin while at Stanford University.8 Stanford holds the PageRank patent, which expires in 2017.9 Google holds an exclusive license for the
PageRank patent by an agreement which has been extended through
2011.10 Under the terms of that license, the Google license will become
non-exclusive after 2011 unless the terms of the agreement are modified.11
Google has continued to develop its PageRank technology, which may provide it substantially greater benefits from the patent than competitors will
have once the patent is available on a non-exclusive basis.

2. Google.com, Google Investor Relations: Google Code of Conduct,
http://investor.google.com/conduct.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2009).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC FILE NO. 071-0170, IN THE MATTER OF
GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK: DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER PAMELA JONES HARBOUR
(2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220harbour.pdf [hearinafter
GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK] (last visited Aug. 12, 2009). See Pamela Samuelson, The Dead Souls of
the Google Book Search Settlement, 7 COMM. OF THE ACM, Jul. 1, 2009
6. Google Investor Relations, supra note 2, at 3.
7. See ZMUDA, supra note 1. See generally John Gruber, Google Is an Advertising Company, DARING FIREBALL, Aug. 29, 2005, http://daringfireball.net/2005/08/google_ad_company
(stating that Google is not a platform based company, but judging from their profits an advertising company).
8. Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 16 (Dec. 31, 2009).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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In addition to its PageRank technology,12 Google uses text-matching
techniques.13 Like Boolean searching, the text matching software looks to
the number of times terms are utilized, the proximity of the text on the web
page and other parameters to determine the rankings of the web search.14
The current update, codenamed Caffeine, began testing in 2009.15
Google has expanded its services significantly beyond the mere sale
of advertising related to its search.16 In 2006 it acquired YouTube, the
primary free host to user-generated video content.17 In 2007, it acquired
DoubleClick, a complementary advertising company which placed ads on
websites based on the content of those sites.18 Google released Orkut in
2004, a social network site;19 Picasa in 2006, a photo sharing service;20 and
briefly operated the virtual world Lively in 2008.21
Google has also become a prime developer of new productivity tools
for the Internet, 22 often in direct competition with Microsoft, Yahoo!, and
Apple as well as other Internet innovators such as Second Life, Skype,
AOL and many smaller competitors. In 2008, Google launched Chrome as
a browser designed to compete with Microsoft Internet Explorer, Apple Sa-

12. Google.com, Corporate Information: Technology Overview,
http://www.google.com/corporate/tech.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
13. Id.
14. See The Spider’s Apprentice, How to Use Web Search Engines,
http://www.monash.com/spidap4.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
15. Google Webmaster Central Blog, Help Test Some Next-Generation Infrastructure,
Aug. 10, 2009, http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/2009/08/help-test-some-nextgeneration.html.
16. See generally Andrew Johnson, Game Time, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, July 9, 2009, at D1.
See generally Nick Clark, Google vs Apple: The Gadget Showdown, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 5, 2010,
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/features/google-vs-applethe-gadget-showdown-1857964.htm.
17. Pete Barlas, Google Says Video Ads on a Roll, INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY, July 20,
2009, at A6.
18. Jim Puzzanghera & Jessica Guynn, Google Gets Grip on Ad Firm, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
12, 2008, at C1.
19. Google.com, Google Milestones, http://www.google.com/corporate/history.html (last
visited Mar. 5, 2010).
20. Id.
21. Lively, http://lively.com/goodbye.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (“Lively was a
network of avatars and virtual rooms created and decorated by its users. Google launched Lively
on July 8, 2008. . . . Lively's users created thousands of cafes, bars, discos, tropical islands, treehouses, space stations, galleries, bedrooms and more. . . . The experiment ended December 31,
2008.”).
22. See Google.com, Google Code: Google Apps, http://code.google.com/googleapps (last
visited Mar. 23, 2010); see Google Inc., Google Press Center: Product Descriptions,
http://www.google.com/press/descriptions.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
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fari, Firefox, and others.23 Google is extending the Chrome brand into a
netbook operating system, which it expects to launch in 2010, directly
competing with the core products of both Microsoft and Apple.24
In addition, Google has created Android, a separate operating system
for smart phones and other Internet enabled devices.25 The Android operating system is supported by the “Open Handset Alliance,” a Googlesupported manufacturing consortium.26 Android competes directly with
RIM BlackBerry, Microsoft’s Windows CE/Mobile, Apple’s iPhone,
Palm’s Pre, and the Symbian Ltd. OS (which is a market leader outside the
United States).27 Google had further attempted to extend its position in cellular phones with the launch of its own handset named Nexus One,28 which
was a direct competitor to Apple and Google’s partners in the Open Phone
Alliance, however Google has since terminated the project.29 Ultimately,
Google was attempting to uncouple consumers’ purchase of handsets from
their choice of cellular phone carriers.30 Google’s other web applications
include Google Docs, Gmail, Blogger, Sites, SketchUp, Talk, Google
Voice, and Google Book Search.31 Google supports a nonprofit foundation
and has recently launched a venture capital fund.32
Despite all Google’s activities, ninety-seven percent of its revenue is
reported to come from advertising.33 Looking at the wide array of products
23. Google also had a distribution agreement with Firefox to promote that browser. See
Stephen Shankland, Google Chrome: Browser Competition Back in High Gear, CNET NEWS,
Sept. 2, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/google-chrome-browswer-competition-back-in-high-gear/.
24. Johnson, supra note 16, at D1.
25. See Michelle Quinn, Helping Digit-ize Google Phones, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at
C1; see also Clark, supra note 16.
26. Id.; Brian Garrity, Google Not Hung Up By Phone Makers, N.Y. POST, Sept. 24, 2008,
at 40.
27. See Quinn, supra note 25; Clark, supra note 16; Mark Long, Android's Rise Crimps
Palm's Sales and Revenue, NEWSFACTOR NETWORK, Feb. 25, 2010,
http://www.newsfactor.com/news/Android-s-Rise-Hurts-Palm-sSales/story.xhtml?story_id=0220001UFKRG&full_skip=1.
28. Clark, supra note 16.
29. Bob Pegoraro, Google Nixes Nexus One, WASH. POST, July 19, 2010, available at
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fasterforward/2010/07/google_nixes_nexus_one.html.
30. Hiawatha Bray, Cellphone Aims to Reinvent Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 2010,
at B7 (describing the strategy for Google is to ultimately separate the purchase of the cellular
phone handset from the carrier, a strategy not actually working with the Nexus One thus far).
31. Google.com, Google Press Center: Product Descriptions,
http://www.google.com/press/descriptions.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2010); More Google Products, http://www.google.gom/intl/en/options/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Google
Product Descriptions]
32. Google Milestones, supra note 19.
33. Barlas, supra note 17, at A6.
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and services it provides, one can wonder whether Google still has a focus.
Perhaps Google is treading the path of IBM, growing too diffuse, risking
antitrust problems and thrashing in the market without a clear direction.
IBM reinvented itself as a service company, but only after fighting a
twenty-year antitrust investigation, the launch of competitors like Microsoft, and losing the PC market it had created.34 Or perhaps Google is following in Microsoft’s footsteps, becoming the very company its founders
most despised; shifting from innovator to aggregator of innovation, acquiring its market share rather than innovating its growth, and struggling to extend its powerful brand into fields in which it has neither presence nor expertise.35 Or perhaps the mantra of “don’t be evil” will help it chart a third
course, which enables it to remain the darling of the public and the stockholders alike.
III. MIXED MESSAGES AND MERGERS
Google has grown through both innovation and acquisition.36 The
most controversial was in April 2007, when it purchased DoubleClick, the
leading firm in display ad placement.37
Although Google rules the market for targeted text ads that are
linked to search results on its own and others' websites, New
York-based DoubleClick [was] a leading provider of technology
to deliver elaborate, targeted display ads to websites. Mountain
View, [California]-based Google aims to create a one-stop, fullservice shop for companies placing ads online and off.38
34. Fred Vogelstein, Why Is Obama’s Top Antitrust Cop Gunning for Google?, WIRED
MAGAZINE, July 20, 2009, available at http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/1708/mf_googlopoly?currentPage=all.
35. Christine Varney, head of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, provided her
prediction of the future.
“For me, Microsoft is so last century. They are not the problem.” The U.S. economy will
“continually see a problem—potentially with Google” because it already “has acquired a monopoly in Internet online advertising,” she said . . . “When all our enterprises move to computing in
the clouds and there is a single firm that is offering a comprehensive solution . . . you are going to
see the same repeat of Microsoft.”
Eric Krangel, Obama's Antitrust Pick: Google is the New Microsoft, BUSINESS INSIDER,
Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.businessinsider.com/obamas-antitrust-pick-google-is-the-newmicrosoft-2009-2.
36. See, e.g., Louise Story & Miguel Helft, Google Buys an Online Ad Firm for $3.1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2007, at B1; Reuters, Google to Supply Search Ads to EBay, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006, at C2.
37. Story & Helft, supra note 35, at B1.
38. Puzzanghera & Guynn, supra note 18, at C1.
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A Federal Trade Commission antitrust review cleared the merger in
December 2007.39 Although a four-to-one majority found no horizontal
monopoly and no lessening of competition, the dissenting Commissioner
took a more forward-looking view:
[E]ven more troubling is that the combination of Google and
DoubleClick likely will affect the evolution of the entire online
advertising market—especially in light of existing network effects, and the tremendous additional network effects the transaction will generate. . . . By purchasing DoubleClick, Google will
acquire data that will contribute to, and exacerbate, network effects. As a result, the Google/DoubleClick combination is likely
to “tip” both the search and display markets in Google’s favor,
and make it more difficult for any other company to challenge
the combined firm.40
The Google/DoubleClick merger was only one such acquisition that
raised questions regarding the ability of competitors to overcome the network effects of Google’s omnipresence. In the fall of 2008, Google and
Yahoo! were forced to abandon a proposed agreement to have Google fulfill some of Yahoo’s ad searches due to Justice Department objections.41
One year earlier, Google acquired YouTube for $1.65 billion.42 In the
three years since the acquisition, YouTube continues to lose money and has
started a transition from user-generated content to content provided by the
traditional movie and television studios.43 Along the way, of course, it embroiled itself in a billion dollar lawsuit with some of those same content
producers over the unauthorized posting of film and television content by
YouTube users.44
39. GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK, supra note 5.
When a publisher side ad server makes a call to retrieve an advertisement, the advertiser
side ad server determines the optimal advertisements, pulls that ad from its inventory, and serves
it into the designated place on the publisher’s web page. Advertiser side ad servers also provide
key data that is used to plan, manage, maintain, track, and analyze the results of online campaigns
across multiple publisher websites. Like publishers, advertisers pay for the use of ad serving
services on a cost per thousand ads served.
40. GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK, supra note 5. (“A network effect arises when a good or service increases in value as more people use it. Feedback fosters acceptance and enhances popularity, which generates even more feedback, in a continually self-reinforcing loop.”).
41. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Yahoo! Inc. and Google Inc. Abandon Their Advertising Agreement (Nov. 5, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/08-at-981.html.
42. Daniel Lyons, Watch the Funny Kittens!, NEWSWEEK, July 20, 2009, at 28.
43. Id.
44. Anne Broache & Greg Sandoval, Viacom Sues Google Over YouTube Clips,
CNET.COM, Mar. 13, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/Viacom-sues-Google-over-YouTube-
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If the DoubleClick merger caused antitrust concerns, the YouTube
acquisition raised the opposite question: why acquire a money-losing aggregator of Internet videos? Never fully explained by the company, the
elusive answer may also be tied to Google’s long-term media-dominance
strategy. Broadcast television and radio are no different in business organization than the search business—in both cases, the broadcaster displays
content free to the consumer but surrounded with advertising. From this
perspective, YouTube is no different from CBS, Yahoo, or a web search.
The difference between YouTube and broadcast television remains
profitability.45 Although Google does not break out YouTube income, analysts continue to acknowledge the losses at YouTube.46 While traditional
media is shrinking, it continues to be profitable, and it is further extending
its reach.47 Founded by Fox and NBC, Hulu.com has already earned
greater revenue than YouTube on a fraction of its audience base.48 The potential to extend the per-viewer average revenue becomes significant.49
Google has recognized the shift by entering into distribution agreements
with traditional media companies.50
Ironically, Hulu embodies the disruptive technology threatening the
traditional broadcast television industry. Hulu is on-demand television
which directly competes with traditional television.51 YouTube’s usergenerated content reflects a different content segment.52 More accurately,
however, YouTube still competes for viewership with traditional television,
and while the tastes and format of YouTube may vary from that of broadclips/2100-1030_3-6166668.html.
45. See Daniel Lyons, Old Media Strikes Back, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 2, 2009, at 13.
46. Id. (“[Arash Amel, analyst for researcher Screen Digest] estimates that last year Hulu
took in $65 million in U.S. ad revenue and cleared $12 million in gross profit, while YouTube
generated $114 million in U.S. revenue but had no gross profit. This year Amel estimates Hulu's
revenue will grow to $175 million in the U.S. and that YouTube will take in slightly less.”).
47. See, e.g., Hulu.com, Media Info, http://www.Hulu.com/about (last visited Mar. 5,
2010).
48. Lyons, Old Media Strikes Back, supra note 44, at 13; see also Barlas, supra note 17, at
A6. (“YouTube had 99 million unique U.S. visitors in June, up 38% from 71.7 million in June
2008, says market tracker Nielsen Online. Hulu, owned by Walt Disney and other media companies, ranked No. 2 with just 10.6 million visitors. Users watched more than 6.1 billion video
streams on YouTube in June. Hulu was No. 2 with 348,310 million, says Nielsen.”).
49. See Barlas, supra note 17, at A6.
50. See, e.g., Press Release, GoDigital Media Group, GoDigital Media Group Adds Premium Film and Television Content to YouTube (Jan. 21, 2010), available at
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/GoDigital-Media-Group-Adds-iw-1413154268.html?x=0&.v=1.
51. See Hulu.com, Media Info, supra note 46.
52. See Don Reisinger, Can Hulu be a Bigger Business Than YouTube?,
TECHCRUNCH.COM, Sept. 1, 2008, http://techcrunch.com/2008/09/01/can-hulu-be-a-biggerbusiness-than-youtube/.
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cast television, such differences will continue eroding as audiences gravitate to YouTube as a source of film and television content.53
So the question remains whether Google’s acquisition of YouTube
was a short-sighted folly or a long-term strategy for dominance.54 If the
broadcasters continue to decline, a central site that delivers content to computers, portable music/video devices, cellular phones and Internet-equipped
televisions could become the new media hub. Consumers want convenience and they prefer free. While iTunes and the iPhone are convenient,
they are tethered to a proprietary platform with high equipment costs and
noticeable content costs.55 Hulu is great for traditional television and movies.56 Google is the quintessential content aggregator—delivered for free in
exchange for advertising.57 Therefore, YouTube may be a long-play for
Google. But with such a dominant audience base, it will pose a formidable
beachhead against other participants entering the business.
Google’s history with traditional media may suggest that it has been
motivated by a strategy to control ad placement across all media.58 Google
attempted to enter the offline advertising business for newspapers, radio
and television as an extension of its Internet dominance, but with far less
success.59 For two years, Google tried to operate a business placing print
ads60and though the program grew to 800 newspapers, tending to control
only the supplemental ad space that the papers were unable to sell.61 As a
result, Google had to close the print ad business, and a month later, Google
closed its radio ad program as well,62 eventually selling the division with its
3600 employees.63 Google continues to persevere in advertising sales for
broadcast television, perhaps because of its long-term synergy with YouTube.64
53. Id.
54. Infra Part X (for discussion on YouTube’s copyright litigation).
55. Julia Layton & Jonathan Strickland, How iTunes Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM,
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/itunes.htm/printable (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
56. See Greg Sandoval, Hulu’s Backers Bicker as Web Video Soars, CNET.COM,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-10398698-261.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
57. See Jack Romanos, The Fine Print in Google’s Plan, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at
M5.
58. See Miguel Helft, Google Ends Sale of Ads in Papers After 2 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 2009, at B3 [hereinafter Google Paper Ads].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Miguel Helft, Google Ends Its Project for Selling Radio Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2009, at B3 [hereinafter Google Radio Ads].
63. Tribune News Service, Google Cuts Pair of Deals, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 2009, at C26.
64. Google Radio Ads, supra note 62.
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Taken together, the strategy of acquiring companies to expand beyond
ad placement into the role of ad broker and broadcaster reflects a solid, vertical integration for the advertising giant.65 The FTC analysis of the DoubleClick merger highlights the strategy.66 Google chose to purchase technology companies that provide toeholds into advertising delivery in each
media, allowing it to expand both horizontally and vertically.67 Rather than
become DoubleClick’s competitor, Google chose to pay billions of dollars
to eliminate a future competitor from the field.68 Implicit in the strategy,
Google further benefits by eliminating a potential acquisition target for its
chief competitors—namely, Microsoft, Apple and Yahoo!.
This approach is not new to Google. To the contrary, it goes to the
central business strategy of the company.69 As Mark Cuban recently noted,
Google “almost joined a long list of companies in the ‘great technology, no
business model’ archives.”70 In April 2002, Google faced a patent litigation lawsuit from Overture Services, Inc., “asserting that certain services
infringed Overture’s U.S. Patent No. 6,269,361” (361 patent).71 Initially,
Google “denied that it infringed the patent and alleged that the patent was
invalid and unenforceable.”72 The patent in question covered the heart of
the AdWords business model.73
In 2003, Yahoo! acquired control of Overture and in so doing, took
ownership of the Google core business model.74 As Google prepared to go
public, it entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement with Yahoo!,
pricing the “fully-paid, perpetual license to the patent” and mutual release
65. See Bob Keefe, Critics Decry Expansion of Google, ATLANTA JOURNALCONSTITUTION, Aug. 25, 2007, at 4C.
66. See generally GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK, supra note 5.
67. See Google Radio Ads, supra note 62 (noting that the entrance into radio ad sales, for
example, came with the purchase of dMarc Broadcasting).
68. See generally Keefe, supra note 65. One can only surmise that the threat that Google
would launch a competitive product may have both brought the owners of DoubleClick to the
bargaining table and affected the sales price, notwithstanding the $3.1 billion paid for the acquisition.
69. See, e.g., Google Radio Ads, supra note 62.
70. Mark Cuban, The Wisest $28.5 Million Ever Spent, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 30, 2009, at 17.
71. Google Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q/A), at 13 (June 30, 2004) [hereinafter
Google Quarterly Report].
72. Id.
73. See Usman Latif, Google’s Bid-for-Placement Patent Settlement Cover-up,
TECHUSER.NET, May 31, 2005, http://www.techuser.net/gcoverup.html (last visited Nov. 29,
2009).
74. See Stefanie Olsen & Margaret Kane, Yahoo to Buy Overture for $1.63 Billion,
CNET.COM, July 14, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1030_3-1025394.html (last visited Nov.
29, 2009).
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of 2.7 million shares of Google Class A common stock.75 The 2.7 million
shares of Google stock, one percent of its stock at the time, covered the
Overture 361 patent and other disputes between the parties.76 From a competitive standpoint, the settlement was the flexion point between the two
search companies. Google was free to grow its business model and to stop
denying the patentability of the AdWords methodology. Yahoo!, which
had paid $1.63 billion to acquire Overture, received substantially less than
one-fifth the value of Overture from the Google settlement.77 Yahoo!
struggled to recapture its investments and began looking back on its strategy while Google cleared itself of potentially game-ending litigation and
moved forward as the dominant search engine on the Internet.
IV. SO WHY THE SOFTWARE?—THE NON-ADVERTISING STRATEGY
An admittedly cynical interpretation of Google’s “don’t be evil” strategy flows from its own approach to advertising. Only recently did Google
begin to advertise. According to the advertising giant’s behavior, advertising is evidently for chumps. Nonetheless, Google has spent some ad
money on billboards to promote its software suite and its apps, including
Google Docs.78 A less cynical view of Google recognizes that since Google already associates its name with every ad sold on behalf of its various
advertising businesses, it needs a different strategy to promote its brand.
By providing free products, Google reinforces its name as an Internet

75. Google Quarterly Report, supra note 71, at 13 (June 30, 2004).
76. See Latif, supra note 73.
77. See id.
At the time of the patent settlement disclosure, 2.7 million shares of Google
represented roughly 1 percent of the company. Google estimated that the
shares were worth somewhere between $260 and $290 million. This estimate was based on Google's proposed IPO price range of $108 to $135 a
share, which was subsequently lowered to $85 a share. Interestingly, even
the $290 million number does not represent any sort of adequate return on
Yahoo's $1.63 billion Overture investment. Yahoo was licensing critical patents to Google at a critical time for less than one fifth of what it paid to acquire them.
Interestingly, Google never paid anything even remotely close to $290 million for the patents. Google quite successfully managed to muddle up the
math by jumbling together the numbers of the patent licensing settlement
with the settlement of a separate second dispute with Yahoo.
Latif, supra note 73. Mark Cuban’s Newsweek column priced the acquisition at an extremely low calculation of $28.5 million, but Cuban gives no explanation of how he arrived at
that calculation. See Cuban, supra note 70, at 17.
78. Tom Krazit, Google Aims at Commuters with Google Apps Ads, CNET.COM,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10301571-93.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2009).
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destination and resource.79 Some of these services deliver behavioral advertising while others do not generate direct revenue. As a business strategy, these free products are less expensive to develop and deliver than the
comparable amount of direct advertising. Moreover, direct advertising is
generally not friendly, so the Google app strategy makes sense from its
corporate agenda.
The bonus for the strategy is the cost aspect of the developed products. By focusing on the core business of Microsoft (including free competitive products for operating systems, browsers, documents, spreadsheets,
presentations, e-mail, and calendars), Google highlights Microsoft’s vulnerability to alternatives.80 Microsoft’s attempt to retaliate with Bing had
limited impact since it does not compete with the AdSense advertising
placement component of Google’s ad network.
V. INTERLOCKING DIRECTORSHIPS A MONOPOLY DANGER—WHO KNEW?
One consequence of the free app marketing strategy for Google has
been the strategy clash with Google’s former chum, Apple. Eric Schmidt,
Google’s CEO, had joined the Apple board of directors in 2006.81 Shortly
thereafter, Schmidt joined Apple CEO Steve Jobs “to announce Apple's
first iPhone.”82 At the time, Schmidt “joked about merging the two companies and calling it ‘AppleGoo,’ citing the compatibility in corporate cultures.”83
The cultures were very compatible, both driven by innovation and a
deep distrust, if not hatred, of common competitor, Microsoft. Apple and
Microsoft were direct competitors in almost every product line, including
computer operating software, applications, music players and smart phone
systems.84 Google’s web-based apps reduced Microsoft’s advantage from
79. See Google Press Center: Product Descriptions, supra note 31 (showing a list of
many of the free useful products Google offers).
80. See J. Nicholas Hoover, Google, IBM Take Another Run at Microsoft’s Office Suite,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Sept. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.informationweek.com/news/software/linux/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=202100053
(noting that despite the competitive products, Office retains roughly a ninety-five percent market
share).
81. Alex Pham, Google CEO Schmidt Resigns from Apple Board, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4,
2009, at B4.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See David Sarno, Microsoft Bids for Relevancy in Smart Phones, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
16, 2010, at B3; see also Allan Hoffman, Web-Based Software Gaining on Once-Mighty Microsoft, STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK), Jan. 21, 2009, at 21; Ben Parr, Google Is Now Apple's Greatest
Enemy: Here's Why, MASHABLE.COM, http://mashable.com/2010/01/20/apple-microsoft-v-
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its installed base, a change which favored Apple.85
In the years since the iPhone launch, however, the two companies
have been on a collision course.86 Google’s Android phone software competes as directly with the iPhone as with the Windows Mobile platform;
Google’s Chrome browser competes directly with Apple’s attempt to move
its Safari browser onto PCs, and the Chrome operating system announcement could put Apple’s modest market share at far greater risk than Windows.87 Both Apple and Google court the student and individual user,
while Windows greatest strength remains in the corporate market.88 Even
worse for Apple, Chrome is designed to support the netbook market segment, the lowest cost web-focused machines.89 These compete with Apple’s iPhone as much as low-end computer sales.90 The growth of the netbook market has put significant price pressure on Apple’s generally more
expensive hardware.91
With such substantial overlap between Apple’s and Google’s expansion, it should have been obvious much earlier that the two companies had
grown to become direct competitors. By May 2009, the FTC began an investigation concerning this overlap.92 In August 2009, Schmidt finally
agreed to step down.93 Surprisingly, his resignation did not come before
the competition turned uncomfortably anticompetitive:
On August 3, 2009, Apple announced that Eric E. Schmidt,
Chief Executive Officer of Google, was stepping down from its
google (last visited Mar. 4, 2010).
85. See Johnson, supra note 16, at D1 (“Some technology experts say formidable searchengine operator Google Inc. dropped a bomb on software giant Microsoft Corp. by announcing
Tuesday night that it is developing its own computer-operating system.”). See also Mike Swift,
Google, Microsoft Vie for ‘cloud’ Control, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 24, 2009, at 21.
86. See generally Pham, supra note 81.
87. See Johnson, supra note 16; see also Pham, supra note 81.
88. See generally Arik Hesseldahl, Students Will Help Save Apple, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug.
28, 2008, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/aug2008/tc20080827_522941.htm; Hoover,
supra note 80.
89. See Johnson, supra note 16.
90. See M.G. Siegler, Apple: Want a Netbook? Try An iPhone or iPod Touch (For Now),
TECHCRUNCH, Apr. 22, 2009, http://techcrunch.com/2009/04/22/apple-want-a-netbook-try-aniphone-or-ipod-touch-for-now/.
91. See Pham, supra note 81.
92. Miguel Helft & Brad Stone, Board Ties at Apple and Google Scrutinized, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 2009, at B1.
93. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Bureau of Competition Director Richard Feinstein Regarding the Announcement that Google CEO Eric Schmidt Has Resigned
from Apple’s Board (Aug. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/08/googlestmt.shtm.
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board. “We have been investigating the Google/Apple interlocking directorates issue for some time and commend them for recognizing that sharing directors raises competitive issues, as
Google and Apple increasingly compete with each other,” said
Bureau of Competition Director Richard Feinstein. “We will
continue to investigate remaining interlocking directorates between the companies.”94
However, the investigation did not end there because Arthur Levinson, former CEO for Genentech Inc., remains on both the Apple and Google boards.95 In addition, former Vice President Al Gore serves as an Apple board member and as a senior advisor to Google,96 as does Bill
Campbell.97
Finally, in October 2009, Levinson recognized he had become a liability.98 Without much additional comment, Levinson resigned from the
board of Google, but remains with Apple.99 The FTC issued a statement
the day after Levinson resigned, commending the parties for resolving the
conflict of interest without resorting to litigation:
“Google, Apple, and Mr. Levinson should be commended for
recognizing that overlapping board members between competing
companies raise serious antitrust issues and for their willingness
to resolve our concerns without the need for litigation,” said
FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz. “Beyond this matter, we will
continue to monitor companies that share board members and
take enforcement actions where appropriate.”100
The interest of the FTC and its jurisdiction under Section 8 of the
Clayton Act evidently did not extend to Gore and Campbell, the two
prominent Google advisors who remain on Apple’s Board of Directors.101
Regardless of the actual inside information passed between the companies, the board of directors should have access to key strategies and trade
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Pham, supra note 81, at B4.
Id.
Cecilia Kang, Apple Director Resigns from Google Board, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2009,

at B6.
98. See generally id.
99. Id.
100. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Statement of FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz Regarding the Announcement that Arthur D. Levinson Has Resigned from Google’s Board
(Oct. 12, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/google.shtm.
101. Id. (noting that Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits someone from serving as director of two competing corporations).

442

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:429

secrets of its company. Mere advisors, of course, do not necessarily have
the same access to inside information as do board members.
If the directors are shielded from the strategic inside information to
avoid potential or actual conflicts of interest, then they may be failing to
meet their fiduciary duties. Therefore, at a bare minimum the interlocking
boards create the appearance of impropriety. Section 8 of the Clayton Act
provides direct regulation of interlocking directorates,102 but the applicability of Section 8 depends on the level of financial competition.103
Section 8 prohibits, with certain exceptions, one person from
serving as a director or officer of two competing corporations if
two thresholds are met. Competitor corporations are covered by
Section 8 if each one has capital, surplus, and undivided profits
aggregating more than $10,000,000, with the exception that no
corporation is covered if the competitive sales of either corporation are less than $1,000,000. Section 8(a)(5) requires the Federal Trade Commission to revise those thresholds annually,
based on the change in gross national product. The new thresholds, which take effect immediately, are $25,319,000 for Section
8(a)(1), and $2,531,900 for Section 8(a)(2)(A).104
The interlock problem is self-evident. “[W]hen an individual simultaneously serves as an officer or director of two competing companies, he
or she stumbles into a prime opportunity for collusion—for example, coordination of pricing, marketing, or production plans of the two companies.”105 The self-evident concept may be more difficult for the FTC to enforce. Given that Google has no “competitive sales” of its free products,
the FTC will need to value the competitive products in a different manner if
it wishes to use Section 8 jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, the interlocking board problem violates Google’s internal policies on conflict of interest:
All of us should avoid circumstances that present even the ap102. Clayton Act of 1914 § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (2009) (“No person shall, at the same time,
serve as a director or officer in any two corporations . . . that are . . . by virtue of their business
and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws . . . .”).
103. See id.
104. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BILLING CODE 6750-01P, REVISED JURISDICTIONAL
THRESHOLDS FOR SECTION 8 OF THE CLAYTON ACT, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/01/P859910sec8.pdf.
105. Gale T. Miller, Interlocking Directorates and the Antitrust Laws, 26 COLO. LAW. 53,
53 (1997); see also Benjamin M. Gerber, Enabling Interlock Benefits While Preventing Anticompetitive Harm: Toward an Optimal Definition of Competitors Under Section 8 of the Clayton Act,
24 YALE J. ON REG. 107, 112 (2007).
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pearance of such a conflict. When faced with a potential conflict of interest, ask yourself:
Would this relationship or situation embarrass me or Google if it showed up on the front page of a newspaper or the
top of a blog?
Am I reluctant to disclose the relationship or situation to
my manager, Legal or Ethics & Compliance?
Could the potential relationship or situation create an incentive for me, or be perceived by others to create an incentive for me, to benefit myself, my friends or family or
an associated business, at the expense of Google?
If the answer to any of these questions is ‘yes,’ the relationship
or situation is likely to create a conflict of interest, and you
should avoid it.106
Arguably, any conduct sufficient to trigger an FTC investigation
should be considered “perceived by others to create an incentive . . . to
benefit . . . an associated business, at the expense of Google.”107 A second
reason the interlocking directorates violate Google’s internal policy stems
from its potential to be a violation of the Sherman Act which prohibits
combinations in restraint of trade.108
The expansion of Google from a search company to a software developer and media distributor changed its relationships with other companies
in the field as well. From its inception as a search engine, Google predatorily faced off against Microsoft, which was slow to embrace the Internet, in
its attempt to dominate the browsers needed to access the Internet.109
106. Google Investor Relations, supra, note 2 at § 3.
107. Id.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal.”); 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”); see also James F. Ponsoldt & Christopher D. David, A Comparison Between U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Treatment of Tying
Claims Against Microsoft: When Should the Bundling of Computer Software Be Permitted?, 27
NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 421, 426 (2007).
109. Microsoft licensed third party software to launch its MSN search service in 1998, the
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When Google was a scrappy young company fighting the Microsoft
colossus, its sniping tactics designed to tweak Microsoft had little market
effect. Today, Google dominates the search market.110 Any actual collusion between Apple and Google regarding operating systems or browsers
would violate the Sherman Act and sitting together in board meetings regarding these products cannot help but raise at least the appearance of impropriety.111 Schmidt’s resignation is a good step, but all overlapping directors should be eliminated if the company takes its ethical code seriously.
VI. ANTITRUST CONCERNS EXTEND TO CONTENT – THE GOOGLE BOOK
SEARCH SETTLEMENT
Stemming from Google’s drive to organize all information,112 it began
the process of digitizing books at the nation’s great libraries, starting with
Page’s alma mater, the University of Michigan.113
“Even before we started Google, we dreamed of making the incredible breadth of information that librarians so lovingly organize searchable online,” said Larry Page, Google co-founder and
president of Products. “Today we're pleased to announce this
program to digitize the collections of these amazing libraries so
that every Google user can search them instantly.
Our work with libraries further enhances the existing Google
Print program, which enables users to find matches within the
full text of books, while publishers and authors monetize that information,” Page added. . . .
For publishers and authors, this expansion of the Google Print
program will increase the visibility of in and out of print books,
same year that Google was launched and its founders started looking for buyers. In 2005, Microsoft replaced Yahoo! Search technology with its own software, significantly revising the product
with Microsoft Live Search in 2006 and Bing in 2009. Reflecting the changing fortunes of these
companies, Microsoft entered into a revenue agreement shortly after the launch of Bing under
which Yahoo! has replaced all its search software with the Microsoft product in exchange for a
revenue sharing agreement. See History of Search Engines: From 1945 to Google 2007,
http://www.searchenginehistory.com/ (last visited Aug, 12, 2009).
110. See Vogelstein, supra note 33.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
112. See Google Milestones, supra note 19 (“Google’s mission [is] to organize the
world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.”).
113. Tom Tigani, University-Google Digitization Effort Turns Page Toward Future in
Book Access, THE UNIVERSITY RECORD ONLINE, Dec. 4, 2006, available at
http://www.ur.umich.edu/0607/Dec04_06/09.shtml.
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and generate book sales via “Buy this Book” links and advertising. For users, Google's library program will make it possible to
search across library collections including out of print books and
titles that weren't previously available anywhere but on a library
shelf.114
The project has developed an unprecedented scale. Professor Pamela
Samuelson described it as “[o]ne of the most significant developments in
the history of books, as well perhaps in the history of copyright. . . .”115
The process resulted in an abortive competitive effort from Microsoft, and
lawsuits by the Authors Guild and a group of commercial publishers.116
After three years of negotiations, the litigation resulted in a proposed settlement between the Authors Guild, the Association of American Publishers, and Google.117 The proposed settlement received preliminary approval
November 14, 2008, but final approval has been delayed by public criticism and the Justice Department’s interest in the settlement terms.118 After
the parties made revisions to address these concerns, the District Court
granted preliminary approval to the Amended Settlement Agreement on
November 19, 2009.119
114. Google Checks Out Library Books,
http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/print_library.html (last visited August 17, 2009).
115. Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace,
MINN. L.REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535067 [hereinafter Samuelson-Manuscript]
116. See Class Action Complaint at 2, The Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at
http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlementresources.attachment/authors-guild-vgoogle/Authors%20Guild%20v%20Google%2009202005.pdf; see Complaint at 1, McGraw-Hill
Co., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8881 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at
http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlementresources.attachment/mcgrawhill/McGraw-Hill%20v.%20Google%2010192005.pdf.
117. See Amended Settlement Agreement, The Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV
8136 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/ (last visited Jan. 20,
2010). See also Google Books Settlement Agreement,
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/agreement/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2010); The Authors Guild
v. Google Settlement Resources Page, http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlementresources.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
118. Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement, The Authors Guild v.
Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at
http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlement-resources.attachment/111408-signedprelim/111408%20Signed%20Prelim%20Approv.pdf; see also Statement of Interest by the U.S.
Dept. of Justice Regarding the Proposed Settlement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., Case
No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f250100/250180.pdf
119. Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement, The
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The focus of the public concern has not centered on any copyright
considerations. Google’s action of copying materials which are not in the
public domain violates the exclusive rights of authors and publishers,120 but
such violations may be permitted under the law if it constitutes fair use.121
Interestingly, whether the public perceives Google’s actions as copyright
infringement or as fair use seems to turn on the individual’s more general
view of Google as a socially desirable public benefactor or as a piratical
advertising shill. Even though “motive” is not part of the fair use analysis,
such characterization often affects the fact finder’s ultimate disposition.122
Reproduction of a work, unlike performance or display, does not need to be
conducted publicly to constitute infringement.123 As courts have recognized, copying may still be actionable.124
[I]ntermediate copying . . . may infringe the exclusive rights
granted to the copyright owner in section 106 of the Copyright
Act regardless of whether the end product of the copying also
infringes those rights. If intermediate copying is permissible
under the Act, authority for such copying must be found in one
of the statutory provisions to which the rights granted in section
106 are subject.125
Of course, the copying of public domain materials is of high social
utility and benefit. Those materials are not in question. Google has made
these public domain works generally available, though it incorporates a
Google watermark onto the PDF copy.126 Nonetheless, Google has already
begun to make commercial use of its public domain library by licensing the
collection to Sony for its e-book reader.127 This may have significant
commercial utility for both Google and Sony, but because exploitation of
the public domain for commercial advantage is economically efficient, it
Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), supra note 116.
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
121. Id. at § 107.
122. Compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) with
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549–50 (1985); Video Pipeline,
Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 198 (3d. Cir. 2003).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). Public performance and display are distinguished from the
other exclusive rights under the statute.
124. Video Pipeline, Inc., 342 F.3d at 207; Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,
1517–19 (9th Cir. 1992).
125. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1519.
126. See Samuelson-Manuscript, supra note 115, at 1, n.7.
127. See Brief for Sony Electronics Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Proposed Google
Book Search Settlement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 1:05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
8, 2009), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/sony.pdf.
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should be lauded.128 Nonetheless, Professor Samuelson raises concerns
that nothing in the proposed book settlement requires Google to “withdraw
these books from display . . . or to charge for them in the future.”129 The
only limit on Google regarding the public domain works is the public domain nature of the files. The mere scanning of the PDF is insufficient to
make the books copyrightable.130 Moreover, it is unlikely the imposition of
the watermark will rise to the level of trademark protection for the public
domain works.131 “The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once
a copyright has expired, like ‘the right to make [an article whose patent has
expired]—including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried
when patented—passes to the public.’”132 Were Google to attempt to extend any ownership on its public domain materials, it would not only violate a long line of established Supreme Court intellectual property precedent, but it would undoubtedly jump from public darling to imperial
predator in a single step.133 Therefore, the public domain should remain
safe since the public benefitted from its diligence.
Unlike the public domain materials, the copying by Google of copyrighted books, without authorization, constitutes intermediate copying
without regard to the eventual display of those books. At first blush, the
copyright case closest to the Google Book Project is UMG Recordings v.
MP3.com, Inc., where, MP3.com provided a service similar to the service
Google provides.134
[D]efendant MP3.com, on or around January 12, 2000, launched
its “My.MP3.com” service, which it advertised as permitting
subscribers to store, customize and listen to the recordings contained on their CDs from any place where they have an internet
connection. To make good on this offer, defendant purchased
tens of thousands of popular CDs in which plaintiffs held the
copyrights, and, without authorization, copied their recordings
onto its computer servers so as to be able to replay the recordings for its subscribers.135
128. Id.
129. See Samuelson-Manuscript, supra note 115, at 1, n.7.
130. Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“originality requires
independent creation plus a modicum of creativity”); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co.,
158 F.3d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1998).
131. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31–32 (2003).
132. Id. at 33 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964)).
133. See generally Sega, 977 F.2d at 1510.
134. UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
135. Id. at 350.
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So MP3.com acted somewhat better than Google in that it purchased
the works it copied. Nonetheless, even though the space-shifting is presumably fair use, the massive unauthorized intermediate copying is still actionable.136 The court did not even consider the issue closely. “The complex marvels of cyberspatial communication may create difficult legal
issues; but not in this case. Defendant's infringement of plaintiff's copyrights is clear.”137 One feature of the Google Book Project, however, was
not part of the MP3.com model. Copyright owners could “opt out” of the
system.138
A brief application of the four statutory fair use prongs highlights the
importance of Google’s opt out policy.139 The benefits of creating an archive of the world’s published knowledge is self-evident, so the digitizing
would likely be deemed as an important and productive use of the works
copied. Moreover, even though there is no transformation for any particular work, the archive as a whole could be deemed transformative, thus favoring Google.140 “The more substantial the contribution that the later
author makes to the expressive domain by his use of copyrighted materials,
the more likely that use is to be deemed a fair use. Courts call this type of
use productive (or transformative) as distinct from simply reproductive (or
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See ROBIN JEWELER, THE GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH PROJECT: IS ONLINE INDEXING A
FAIR USE UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW?, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. NO. RS22356, at CRS-2 (2005)
(explaining the fair use question in the Google Book Project is slightly different than that faced
by MP3.com because the copyright holder could “opt out” from having the work appear on Google’s site. “After some academic and commercial publishers objected to the Library Project,
Google took a brief hiatus from scanning to allow publishers time to identify works that they, i.e.,
the copyright holders, do not want to be included in the digital database. This has been referred
to an ‘opt out’ plan.”).
139. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding
is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
140. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 561.
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superseding).”141
As for the second prong, the nature of the works will vary. Poets may
be concerned that even a small portion of a book could reproduce their entire creative work, while academic works will be more widely available, so
the second factor is unhelpful.142 As to the third factor, the amount taken is
the entirety of the work, thus favoring the plaintiffs.143 As often is the case,
the outcome could turn on the fourth prong—the effect on the potential
market for the copyrighted work, and the potential is certainly there.144 The
digitization could have been licensed for a fee. The online snippets might
have a discrete market value and Google should admit that access to the database has significant economic value to improve its search algorithms,
speech recognitions software, and other products.145 The potential market
could be quite large in the aggregate. For any one author or publisher, the
benefits may be modest and potentially market speculative, but taken as a
class, the market becomes quite significant.146
Publishers were rightly concerned that a fair use court determination
would turn copyright “on its head,” requiring copyright owner to object as
a precondition of enjoining infringement.147 But these are topsy-turvy
times for which Google’s opt out provision could well satisfy the general
anti-copyright sentiment of the public. Still, Google’s honeymoon as the
only beloved corporate behemoth has been fading.148 If the Book Project
were perceived as a cynical tool to sell advertising, then Google would be
seen as usurping a market the publishers should have been able to license.
If Google could actually make a significant profit, then it should license the
works, which is the essence of the fair use analysis for commercial reproduction. The fair use analysis suggests that the Google Book Search database should be licensed. Therefore, the parties attempted settlement, and
141. William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake
of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1649 (2004) (emphasis in original).
142. Compare Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1533
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that “fictional works . . . require more protection”), with Princeton
Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1405 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that “factual compilations . . . may be used more freely”).
143. See Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc., 471 U.S. at 564–65 (discussing the quantitative and
qualitative importance of fair use).
144. Id. at 566 (“This last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
use.”).
145. See id. at 564–65.
146. See id.
147. See Jeweler, supra note 136.
148. See generally Sherwin Siy, Google Book Search Lawsuit Settled, Fair Use Questions
Remain: Settlement Proposes Book Rights Registry, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, Oct. 28, 2008,
http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1828.
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the antitrust concerns began.149
Proponents of the Google Book Search settlement point to the societal
benefits. Mark Lemley, a highly regarded intellectual property professor at
Stanford and a lawyer for Google, explains the benefits as follows:
The settlement will permit Google to digitize most books published in the U.S. Members of the public will have access to
electronic copies of previously unavailable works: It will be
possible to search the content of the books for free, and to preview full pages from out-of-print books for free, allowing members of the public to find the books and the information they
need. People who decide they want a book for themselves will
be able to buy a digital version that they can read online. Libraries will be given licenses to provide free, complete access to outof-print books at terminals in their buildings. And institutions
will be able to buy subscriptions to vast catalogs of works. The
public gets access to works that have, as a practical matter, been
unavailable for years or decades and have never been searchable; authors and publishers get revenue from works that had
long since stopped generating any. The result is clearly beneficial to all concerned.150
Lemley’s analysis, however, does not address the antitrust issues involved with Google’s position in this system.151 Nor does it address the
costs associated with these benefits.152
One cost associated with the benefit is borne by the rights holders to
so-called orphan works—those copyrighted books for which the rights
holder cannot be identified.153 In some cases, the orphan works are created
when publishers go out of business without assigning their copyrights; in
other cases orphan works arise from poorly managed estates, or in other
situations where the rights transfers are forgotten, lost or mishandled.154 In
these cases, the party with the legal right to enforce the copyright is unknown, thus making it all but impossible for publishers to ask for permission to use these works.155 Parties who respect copyright law cannot find a
149. Mark A. Lemley, An Antitrust Assessment of the Google Book Search Settlement,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431555 (click “one click Download”) (last visited Aug. 17,
2009).
150. Id.
151. See generally id.
152. See generally id.
153. See Samuelson, supra note 5.
154. See id.
155. See id.
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legitimate copyright holder from whom to license the rights; infringers can
act with impunity if they dare.156
Despite suggestions to the contrary,157 the experience of many entertainment attorneys may bear out the proposition that orphan works do not
actually dominate the out-of-print market. In many situations, the copyright has descended to multiple family members by will or intestate succession. These family members have limited incentive to police the copyrights of out-of-print works unless the book suddenly becomes the focus of
a possible film deal or other high-value transaction. In most cases, the
rights holders for out-of-print books are known; they just are not interested.158
From an antitrust perspective, the settlement provides Google a
unique market position to be free of the risk of litigation for all orphan
works.159 Google will be the only company that can lawfully sell the orphan works or monetize advertising related to them.160 Every other company that elects to do so risks the orphan finding a parent. The Google
Book Search highlights the orphan works problem and should encourage
rights owners to seek their rights with the lure of obtaining lost revenue.161
Part of the settlement requires Google to support a non-profit, collective
rights organization called the Book Rights Registry (BRR), who would collect and distribute the revenue.162 The BRR is required to provide provenance information about the works claimed, further reducing the scope of
the orphan works problem.163 If the revenue is significant, the number of
156. See id.
157. Professor Samuelson suggests that orphan works are “most” of the seventy percent of
the books in the Book Search repository. But that appears to conflate books for which the transaction costs of enforcing the copyright outweighs the value of the copyright with those works
which have no one able to enforce their rights. Id.
158. See id.
159. See Samuelson, supra note 5.
160. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 117, at § 6.3(a)(i)(1) (noting that Google will not receive the authors’ proceeds because these funds are segregated into the Books
Rights Registry).
161. See Samuelson, supra note 5.
162. See Google.com, Amended Settlement Overview,
https://sites.google.com/a/pressatgoogle.com/googlebookssettlement/revisedsettlement/SettlementModificationsOverview.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
The amended settlement agreement requires the Book Rights Registry to search for
rightsholders who have not yet come forward and to hold revenue on their behalf.
The settlement now also specifies that a portion of the revenue generated from unclaimed works may, after five years, be used to locate rightsholders, but will no
longer be used for the Registry’s general operations or redistributed to other
rightsholders.
163. Id.
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phantom works will shrink. If the revenue is not significant, there is no
market to monopolize.
A legislative or judicial modification could further improve the situa164
tion.
A second class action lawsuit or Congressional act should provide
a safe harbor for any publisher that wishes to publish a work from the BRR,
which has not had its copyright owners identified following the five years
that royalties were collected on behalf of the work. Such a safe harbor
would protect publishers if the rights holders ever come forward. Such a
solution would negate the cultural, rather than legal, monopoly that Google’s presence in the Book Search provides.165
While there is no doubt that Google will receive some network effect
benefits from the orphan works, the scope of these rights is trivial to the
overall publishing market. This should not be the source of antitrust concerns. The real value in improving the search algorithms and other products flows from the scope of the database, which is largely built by
publishers that have acceded to the class action settlement, as well as
physical access to the public domain works in the collection.166
A different aspect of the case, however, does raise more serious antitrust considerations. Pursuant to the proposed settlement, “Google agreed
to turn over 63 percent of the revenues and data regarding use and sales to a
‘Registry’ that would distribute the funds to copyright holders.”167 At the
time of the initial proposed settlement, the U.S. Department of Justice
raised antitrust and other concerns.168 “First, through collective action, the
Proposed Settlement appears to give book publishers the power to restrict
price competition. Second . . . other digital distributors may be effectively
precluded from competing with Google in the sale of digital library prod164. See id. (“[T]he settlement agreement takes one important step towards opening up
access to unclaimed books. In the meantime, we [Google] continue to encourage legislation that
provides meaningful avenues for any entity to use these [orphan] works.”).
165. See Derek Slater, Google Book Search Settlement and Access to Out of Print Books,
June 2, 2009, http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/06/google-book-search-settlementand.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2009) (“Under the settlement Google will be able to open up access to truly orphaned books . . . [t]he need for comprehensive orphan works legislation is not
diminished.”).
166. See generally RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (Caravan 2008) (designating the opt out for the class
has undoubtedly helped Google win over these publishers).
167. Timothy J. Brennan, The Proposed Google Book Settlement: Assessing Exclusionary
Effects, COMPETITION POLICY INT’L: THE ANTITRUST CHRON., Oct. 2009, rel. 2 at 2.
168. See generally Statement of Interest by the U.S. Dept. of Justice Regarding the Proposed Settlement, supra note 118, at 27 (noting also that the DOJ raised concerns related to the
representation of the class, which are important to the litigation but less relevant here to the characterization of Google and its conduct).
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ucts and other derivative products to come.”169
The Justice Department’s characterization is accurate and has remained unaddressed by the amendment to the proposed settlement.170 The
proposed settlement allows Google, the Authors Guild, and the Association
of American Publishers to agree on a pricing mechanism for digital
works.171 For example, the settlement allows Google to set an institutional
fee for access to the collected database on a full-time-equivalency (FTE)
basis.172
The economic terms for Institutional Subscriptions of Books will be
governed by two objectives: (1) the realization of revenue at market rates
for each Book and license on behalf of Rightsholders; and (2) the realization of broad access to the Books by the public, including institutions of
higher education. Plaintiffs and Google view these two objectives as compatible, and agree that these objectives will help assure both long-term
revenue to the Rightsholders and accessibility of the Books to the public.173
To the extent that the Authors Guild and the Association of American
Publishers agrees with Google that broad access and maximizing revenue
are compatible, they are engaging in behavior that should be questioned
under the Sherman Act.174 The goal of authors and publishers is to maximize revenue, which may be achieved by raising prices or by lowering
prices to encourage greater adoption. In either case, the activity of combining the class action of publisher and authors with Google is a massive
agreement to set prices. This fits uncomfortably within the competitive
framework by: “(1) the creation of an industry-wide revenue-sharing formula at the wholesale level applicable to all works; [and] (2) the setting of
default prices and the effective prohibition on discounting by Google at the
retail level . . . .”175
Similarly, digital copies of books may be sold at a price “to be determined by an algorithm (the “Pricing Algorithm”) that Google will design to
find the optimal price for each such Book in order to maximize revenues

169. Id. at 17.
170. See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 117, at § 4.1(a)(iii).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at § 4.1 (a)(i).
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2008); see Statement of Interest by the U.S. Dept. of Justice Regarding the Proposed Settlement, supra note 118, at 17 (“these features of the Proposed Settlement bear an uncomfortably close resemblance to the kinds of horizontal agreements found to be
quintessential per se violations of the Sherman Act.”).
175. Id.
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for the Rightsholder for such Book . . . .”176 This optimization and maximization allows Google to quantify the market for books based on sales
data and other information that private publishers could never share with
one another. Amendments to the provision imply that the pricing will be
based on comparisons of each book to the market rather than a dynamic database (which would create a further pricing advantage for Google) but the
requirement that price data be “historical” will not have pro-competitive
effects.177 The optimization is unlikely to be in furtherance of price competition or the best interests of the consumer public.
Contrast the proposed Google settlement with the settlements involving ASCAP and BMI.178 In the case of the consent action involving the
performing rights societies, the court administrating the consent decree retains jurisdiction over the competitiveness of the licenses.179 Unlike the
Google settlement, ASCAP and BMI are not left to set the market prices
without supervision.180 “Although, under the terms of the BMI Consent
Decree, BMI bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of its
rates, the setting of appropriate rates remains the responsibility of the District Court.”181
Absent this continuing supervision, the ability of the parties collectively—or Google on the parties’ behalf—to set the prices for digital content appears to reach the same anticompetitive heights as ASCAP and BMI
meet with regard to public performances. The court’s failure to recognize
this in its preliminary approval is more likely to be the source of the Justice
Department’s interest than concern for orphan works. While the consent
decree involving ASCAP and BMI suffers from excessive judicial entanglement, it has created a mechanism for fair licensing and public accountability for collectively managed private intellectual property resources.
This is the accountability missing from the current proposed settlement.
Worse yet, the internal dispute process is subject to a blanket of confidentiality, further hiding the mechanisms of the content pricing.182 The move
towards a collective rights arrangement is in the settlement. The BRR al176. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 117, at § 4.2 (b)(i)(2).
177. Id.
178. United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 426 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Because of the
inherently anti-competitive conditions under which BMI and ASCAP operate, they are regulated
by court-approved consent decrees.”) (citing United States v. ASCAP, 1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH)
¶ 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), as amended, United States v. ASCAP, 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶
62,594 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 95.
182. See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 115, at §§ 9.1, 9.8.

2010]

SEARCHING INSIDE GOOGLE

455

ready acts as an author’s rights society, which will encourage membership
through payments.183 This is only an interim step, however, for “the settlement does not directly confer on BRR the right to license any books.”184
As with other concerns, Google faces scrutiny over the Google Book
Search in many countries, such as Germany, France and China.185 The outcomes and solutions are likely to vary considerably from country to country. In most countries, the performing rights societies are government
agencies, so the ASCAP/BMI consent decree is unique in the world. As
such, this proposed resolution is unlikely to be adopted by other nations.
The Internet may be global, but nations remain territorial and apply their
laws accordingly. Hopefully, the Justice Department will insist that the
court exercise far greater control over the pricing and other collusive aspects of the proposed settlement, substituting its own authority for that of
the American Arbitration Association.
VII. COPYRIGHT ISSUES STILL AT STAKE
Even if the orphan book issues are economically overstated by critics,
the Book Search Project and the massive digitization continues to have significant copyright implications. The first is simply the existence of the project itself. By its very nature, Google’s action of copying first and then negotiating only once it held a valuable corpus of content simply flies in the
face of international copyright law and ethical corporate governance. In
essence, Google’s approach has been one of “too big to jail”—an approach
that has thus far succeeded in the U.S. but is less welcome in other countries.186 David Drummond, Google’s Senior Vice President of Corporate
Development and Chief Legal Officer, explains that the “settlement will
create an educational, cultural, and commercial platform to expand access
to millions of long-forgotten books for anyone in the United States. It will
enrich our country’s cultural heritage and intellectual strength [in the global
economy].”187 Drummond rationalizes that copying books is no different
183. Id. at §§ 6.6, 6.7.
184. Samuelson-Manuscript, supra note 115, at 10, n. 69.
185. Andrew Jacobs, Google Apologizes to Chinese Authors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2010,
at B3 (“Google has agreed to hand over a list of books by Chinese authors that it has scanned in
recent years . . . in an apparent effort to placate writers who say their works were digitized without their permission. . . . Google also apologized for any misunderstanding that might have angered authors . . . .”).
186. See id.
187. Competition and Commerce in Digital Books: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (testimony of David Drummond, Senior Vice President of Corporate Development and Chief Legal Officer of Google, Inc.).
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than indexing web content188—a deeply cynical analysis hardly consistent
with a company that strives to do no evil. If the company truly believes its
actions are beyond reproach from a copyright standpoint, then the choice to
settle does not reflect good corporate stewardship. If the company is
choosing to settle a copyright case it knows it can win because of the antitrust immunity it affords, then the public is undoubtedly the loser. Only if
the fair use argument is indeterminable does Google have an honorable reason to settle the litigation, a position the Chief Legal Officer seems unwilling to concede.
Getting past the predatory intent, there is a second shadow thrown by
the decision to settle the litigation. The settlement creates another topsyturvy result to fair use, making the printing of pages from Google public
access terminals subject to a printing fee even if the same material printed
elsewhere would be treated as fair use.189 This creates a normative change
regarding the expectations of publishers to capture the photocopy revenue
that has traditionally been considered fair use.190 This normative expectation will undoubtedly delight publishers—the beneficiaries of the price setting—but actually undermine the very fair use values Google aspires to
protect. Google will not be the only source for some of these books, but
the network effect of Google’s growing content empire may threaten meaningful competition. As a result, Google’s size may rewrite fair use in unexpected and unintended ways.
The impact of “too big to jail” creates an additional copyright policy
concern. If the settlement approach creates a precedent, it will encourage
other copyright predators to seek sufficient network effects in order to
overcome copyright owners’ objections to the use of their content. In fact,
this strategy may already be observed in Viacom v. YouTube.191 As discussed infra, Google’s size and prominence changed YouTube’s future and
gave the company the resources to avoid the injunctive relief that ended
Napster, Grokster, and many others.192 The implication that with sufficient
188. Id.
189. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 117, at § 4.8(a)(ii); see SamuelsonManuscript, supra note 115, at 1.
190. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387; Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60
F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that photocopying is not fair use when done on an institution-wide basis); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352-53 (Ct. Cl.
1973), aff’d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376, 376 (1974); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. at 1535.
191. Complaint at 2, Viacom Int’l. Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007) (No.
1:07 CV02103), 2007 WL 775611. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
192. E.g., MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334
F.3d 643, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1004 (9th Cir.
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network effects a party can rewrite copyright may explain the seemingly
awkward inclusion by Drummond that the settlement will “preserve Congress’s role in setting copyright policy.”193
How does the settlement reinforce the congressional role in copyright? Drummond’s testimony on behalf of Google does not actually answer this question, but rather states “[t]he settlement does not establish new
copyright law; it is not even a determination on the merits of copyright law.
All the settlement represents is the means by which the class of rights holders decided to resolve the lawsuit.”194 As such, Drummond both attempts
to placate those at the congressional hearing, and, at the same time, to acknowledge that the center for the copyright balance has moved to Google.195
Copyright policy has always included a balancing of competing public and industry interests regarding the copyright industries.196 Nonetheless, the balancing has gone on within the halls of Congress rather than the
campuses of Silicon Valley.197 If copyright policy can be determined by a
single, successful player, then the other copyright industries, as well as the
public, may someday be at risk.
VIII. TRADEMARK BATTLES AROUND THE GLOBE
Antitrust and copyright issues are not Google’s only international
concerns.198 Being the largest Internet advertiser cannot be easy. Google
finds itself defending its intellectual property and business practices around
the globe.199 The practices are not uniform, yet every act of customization
2001).
193. Competition and Commerce in Digital Books: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on Competition and Commerce in Digital
Books] (testimony of David Drummond, Senior Vice President of Corporate Development and
Chief Legal Officer of Google, Inc.).
194. Id.
195. Hearing on Competition and Commerce in Digital Books , supra note 193, at 7-9.
196. See, e.g., Russell J. Anderson, Jr., Return of the Guilds: A Reflection on the Domestic and International Implications of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 49, 49
(2003); Christopher M. Bruner, Culture, Sovereignty, and Hollywood: UNESCO and the Future
of Trade in Cultural Products, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 351 (2008); Mark S. Nadel, How
Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: The Overlooked Impact of Marketing, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785 (2004).
197. See, e.g., Hearing on Competition and Commerce in Digital Books, supra note 193,
at 5–6 (providing an example of a Google representative appearing before Congress, the author
includes testimony of David Drummond, Senior Vice President of Corporate Development and
Chief Legal Officer of Google, Inc.).
198. See Google Annual Report, supra note 8, at 25.
199. Id.
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raises concerns of local censorship. According to Google’s 2009 10-K:
Companies have filed trademark infringement and related claims
against us over the display of ads in response to user queries that
include trademark terms. The outcomes of these lawsuits have
differed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We currently have
three cases pending at the European Court of Justice, which will
address questions regarding whether advertisers and search engines can be held liable for use of trademarked terms in keyword
advertising. We are litigating, or have recently litigated similar
issues in other cases, in the U.S., Australia, Austria, Brazil,
Chile, China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Taiwan, and the
United Kingdom.200
IX. ADWORDS, META TAGS, AND HIDDEN TEXT
Courts in different cases and jurisdictions have struggled to determine
whether the use of a trademark by an unauthorized party, to drive web traffic to its site, constituted trademark infringement.201 No court, for example,
has suggested that the use by a consumer of a trademark in the search for
products would generate trademark infringement by that consumer. If a
consumer uses “Kleenex” as a search term, the search engine will return
hits for Kleenex® products, Kleenex® retailers, news stories where the
word was used, and less relevant uses. Under the trademark first sale doctrine, product resellers should face no legal limits from the trademark
owner for merely “displaying” the availability of the brand at its site.202
Courts have found liability, however, if the trademark is added to the domain name.203
200. Id.
201. See Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1995)
(explaining the disagreement between Ninth and Fifth Circuits).
202. Id. at 1076.
It is the essence of the ‘first sale’ doctrine that a purchaser who does no more than
stock, display, and resell a producer’s product under the producer’s trademark violates no right conferred upon the producer by the Lanham Act. When a purchaser
resells a trademarked article under the producer's trademark, and nothing more,
there is no actionable misrepresentation under the statute.
Id.
203. E.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 123–
24 (2004); PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding
that Plaintiff “PACCAR demonstrated a strong likelihood of success . . . of its trademark infringement claim” and remanded for further proceedings); People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 362 (4th Cir. 2001); Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W.
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A slightly different question arises if a competitor uses a trademark to
generate ad links without otherwise using the competitor’s trademark on its
website. Specifically, one of the key sources of Google’s income flows
from selling text ads online, which appear in a box either on the right side
of the search results or above the search results.204 In a series of cases, including Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc.,205 two of Google’s services have
come under increasing judicial scrutiny, regarding the rights of Google to
sell access to a trademark holder’s mark.
AdWords is Google's program through which advertisers purchase
terms (or keywords). When entered as a search term, the keyword triggers
the appearance of the advertiser's ad and link. An advertiser's purchase of a
particular term causes the advertiser's ad and link to be displayed on the
user's screen whenever a searcher launches a Google search based on the
purchased search term. Advertisers pay Google based on the number of
times Internet users “click” on the advertisement, so as to link to the advertiser's website. . . .206
In addition to Adwords, Google also employs Keyword Suggestion Tool, a program that recommends keywords to advertisers
to be purchased. The program is designed to improve the effectiveness of advertising by helping advertisers identify keywords
related to their area of commerce, resulting in the placement of
their ads before users who are likely to be responsive to it. . . .
Once an advertiser buys a particular keyword, Google links the
keyword to that advertiser's advertisement. The advertisements
consist of a combination of content and a link to the advertiser’s
webpage. Google displays these advertisements on the search
result page either in the right margin or in a horizontal band immediately above the column of relevance-based search results.
These advertisements are generally associated with a label,
which says “sponsored link” . . . 207
....
. . . Google’s objective in its AdWords and Keyword Suggestion

Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Cardservice Int’l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 743 (E.D. Va. 1997);
Green Prods. Co. v. Independence Corn By-Prods. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070, 1082 (N.D. Iowa
1997).
204. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2009).
205. Id. at 123.
206. Id. at 125.
207. Id. at 126.
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Tool programs is to sell keywords to advertisers.208
In early jurisprudence on the issue, the threshold analysis focused on
whether the sale of the keyword was a “use in commerce” of the plaintiff’s
trademark.209 The “use in commerce” language in the Lanham Act has a
number of potentially different meanings.210 Until this year, courts in the
Second Circuit had interpreted the term to require that the trademark appear
on the potential infringer’s page; merely purchasing the keyword for promotion of a sponsored link was insufficient.211 Other circuits had not followed this interpretation and found the sale of the keywords was sufficient
to be “in commerce.”212 In a dispute between GEICO and Google, for example, the Virginia district court found the sale of the keyword sufficient to
establish the trademark was “in commerce” and “in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising.”213
The Gilson trademark treatise agreed with this broader interpreta214
tion.
“The ‘use in commerce’ requirement means that the mark has traveled in or affected interstate commerce and ‘commercial use’ means that
the use attempts to influence consumers to purchase goods or services.”215
In a similar case involving GoTo.com, U.S. district courts in New Jersey
found that the use of trademarks as suggested keywords constituted a use

208. Id.
209. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 406 (2d Cir. 2005).
210. See Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 131–36.
211. Regina Nelson Eng, A Likelihood of Infringement: The Purchase and Sale of
Trademarks as Adwords, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 493, 505 (2008).
The rationale for relying on the definition of “use in commerce” provided in section fortyfive of the Lanham Act is flawed for several reasons. First, the courts are applying the definition
of “use in commerce” outside of the context for which it was intended. Second, infringement
under the Lanham Act does not require a visual use of the trademark. Third, trademark keying is
a use of a trademark in a manner that indicates the source or origin. Fourth, the Rescuecom v.
Google court’s analogy to retail store product placement is flawed. Finally, the courts failed to
consider that the invisible use of trademarks in metatags has long been considered a trademark
use.
Id.
212. E.g., J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. Ltd. LP v. Settlement Funding LLC, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1780, 1785 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc. v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677
(N.D. Ill. 2006); Edina Realty Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1039, 1042 (D.
Minn. 2006); Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841, 1844 (E.D. Va.
2005).
213. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 702 (earlier proceeding) (citing People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2001)).
214. 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE ET AL., GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 7A.09 (2009) [hereinafter GILSON].
215. Id.
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“in commerce.”216 GoTo’s product “solicit[ed] bids from advertisers for
key words or phrases to be used as search terms, giving priority results on
searches for those terms to the highest-paying advertiser.”217 This met the
“use in commerce” test.
GoTo makes trademark use of the JR marks in three ways. First,
by accepting bids from those competitors of JR desiring to pay
for prominence in search results, GoTo trades on the value of the
marks. Second, by ranking its paid advertisers before any ‘natural’ listings in a search results list, GoTo has injected itself into
the marketplace, acting as a conduit to steer potential customers
away from JR to JR’s competitors. Finally, through the Search
Term Suggestion Tool, GoTo identifies those of JR’s marks
which are effective search terms and markets them to JR’s competitors. Presumably, the more money advertisers bid and the
more frequently advertisers include JR’s trademarks among their
selected search terms, the more advertising income GoTo is
likely to gain.218
The Northern District of California adopted this reasoning against
Google, finding that the use of the plaintiff’s trademarks in the AdWords
advertising program constituted a use in commerce that is likely to cause
consumer confusion.219 Other courts have likewise found that the “use in
commerce” exception is no longer a barrier to trademark infringement actions. Cases in Minnesota and Virginia, for example, have tended to conflate the concepts of “use in commerce” and “commercial use” but in doing
so focus on the sale of the keyword rather than its absence on the third
party website.220 As a result, in those cases, the purchase of a trademark
has been held to infringe the mark.221
The Second Circuit decision in Rescuecom reinforces the trend to
treat the sale of keywords as a use in commerce.222 This opinion is noteworthy because of the thoughtful correction provided by the Court regarding the technical bar that had developed surrounding the term “in com216. 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 292 (D. N.J. 2006).
217. Id. at 277.
218. Id. at 285.
219. Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450,
20 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
220. GILSON, supra note 214, at § 7A.09 (citing J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. LP v. Settlement
Funding LLC, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1780 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1039 (D. Minn. 2006)).
221. Id.
222. Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 126–27, 131.
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merce.”223
Of course, as the decisions against Google in California and Virginia
point out, the mere use of the keywords does not automatically give rise to
liability for infringement. Rescuecom and Google settled their dispute following the Second Circuit decision.224 Nonetheless, the legal issues involving Google’s use of keyword advertising continue.
[W]here keyword placement of . . . advertising is being sold, the
portals and search engines are taking advantage of the drawing
power and goodwill of these famous marks. The question is
whether this activity is fair competition or whether it is a form of
unfair free riding on the fame of well-known marks.225
With the barrier of “in commerce” lifted, the courts must still determine whether the use by a third party constitutes a likelihood of initial interest confusion.226 The focus of this confusion is generally referred to as
“initial interest confusion” because the consumer undoubtedly realizes that
he has been directed elsewhere prior to the completion of the transaction.227
Nevertheless, where the goods or services directly compete and the mark is
sufficiently strong, the unauthorized trademark user has effectively purchased the plaintiff’s trademark for the purpose of generating customer interest from the competitor’s mark.228
Initial interest confusion is still applied through the likelihood of confusion test.229 Although described differently in various circuits, the general parameters are the same in each.230 In reviewing the question, several
223. Id. at 131.
224. Greg Piper, Early AdWords Infringement Plaintiff Drops Suit, but Concessions Unclear, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Mar. 9, 2010 (“Rescuecom is ready to declare victory over
‘Googleiath,’ it said late Friday, because Google banned competitors’ trademarks from appearing
in ad copy a few years ago, eliminating one of Rescuecom’s main complaints.”).
225. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:70.1 (2004)).
226. Id.
227. Brookfield Commc’ns. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1063 (9th Cir.
1999); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 257–58 (2d Cir. 1987).
228. Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1065–66.
229. MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW 167–68 (2d ed. 2009).
230. Id. at 166. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d
Cir. 1961).
Where the products are different, the prior owner’s chance of success is a function of
many variables: the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the
proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the buyers. Even this extensive catalogue does not exhaust the possibilities—the court may have to take still other variables into account.
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factors are accorded greater significance, including: the strength of the
mark, the similarity between the two marks, the good faith of the party utilizing the second mark, and actual confusion.231
The strength of the mark often dominates the outcome of these disputes. GEICO is a famous, heavily ad-supported trademark, and Rescuecom’s website receives 17,000 to 30,000 hits monthly.232 The similarity of
the two marks will also play an important factor, limiting even owners of
famous marks from not to reaching too broadly to stop unrelated uses.233
Owners of trademarks that wish to police keywords will need to improve
the survey evidence of actual confusion. The evidence presented thus far
suggests the Sponsored Links do generate a great deal of confusion.234
“According to the survey results, 67.6% of test group respondents expected
that they would reach GEICO’s [w]eb site if they clicked on the Sponsored
Links, and 69.5% thought that the Sponsored Links were either links to
GEICO’s site or affiliated with GEICO in some way.”235 Despite the
GEICO Court’s disdain for the survey, it nonetheless found these numbers
sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion for the Sponsored
Links, though the GEICO Court felt the same survey’s flaw compelled a
different result for the keywords.236 Such evidence will only become more
sophisticated in future cases.
The final factor, however, may become the most significant. Where
Google sold trademarks to direct competitors of the trademark holder and
those competitors purchased the trademarks of their direct competition for
the purpose of promoting Sponsored Links when the public sought information about particular trademarks, courts are increasingly likely to find a
likelihood of confusion.237 The reason is simple: the sale of trademarks for
that purpose intentionally deceives the public using the search engine.238
Id.
231. LAFRANCE, supra note 229, at 168; Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d
492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
232. Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 125.
233. LAFRANCE, supra note 229, at 170.
234. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841, 1846 (E.D. Va.
2005).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1847.
237. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 125; FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. Les Perfumes, Inc., 2009 WL 4609268 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
238. See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1226 (11th Cir.
2008) (providing as an example that false statements made by doctors “logically would influence
a [consumer’s] decision to purchase the [product] over a competing machine without those qualities.”).
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Other commentators have even stronger opinions:
Nonetheless, courts should broaden the interpretation to encompass the activities of Google in trademark keying in AdWords.
Google is more directly involved in the infringement than those
acting as service providers have historically been because Google is not merely a passive conduit for the infringing activity, but
Google actually sells the trademarks to the advertisers. Google
also designs the appearance and sets the location of the advertisements in a manner most likely to deceive consumers into believing they have selected an organic search result. Google just
recently changed the background of the “sponsored links” that
top the search results from a pastel blue to a barely noticeable
pale yellow. The pale yellow background is virtually impossible
to see, so even search engine users who are aware that paid advertisements appear before the search results will likely be confused.239
The alternative view is that the public does not recognize or respect
brand names, such that the use of those brands in keyword searches is
merely shorthand for the product category.240 But this approach undermines the entirety of trademark practice. A policy designed to encourage
the public’s disparagement of trademarks will reduce their value.241 A system in which searches using trademarks will not automatically convert
trademarks into product categories will improve the trademark’s function
as a designation of source or origin for a product.242
Keywords are not the only way in which trademarks may be improperly used on the Internet. Google is often discussed in the context of meta
tags because some search engines rely on matching words and their frequency for search relevancy.243 “[M]eta keywords tag . . . allows the creator of a web site to provide additional text for some search engines to index, along with the text of the web page.”244 Increasingly, the use of a third

239. Eng, supra note 211, at 516–17.
240. See generally Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, The Search Engine Advertising Market: Lucrative Space or Trademark Liability?, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 223 (2009).
241. See id. at 235–36.
242. See generally Gregory R. Shoemaker, Comment, Don't Blame Google: Allowing
Trademark Infringement Actions Against Competitors Who Purchase Sponsored Links On Internet Search Engines Under The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 535
(2009).
243. GILSON, supra note 214, at § 7A.08.
244. Id.
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party’s trademark in one’s meta tags or in hidden text245 can give rise to
trademark liability.246
The liability for use of meta tags or hidden text will arise from initial
interest confusion where the introduction of the plaintiff’s trademark is designed to attract business for the defendant.247 However, if the use of the
meta tag accurately reflects the information on the site, then no liability
should arise.248
Along with hidden text and hidden links, meta tags can be used to
fool these types of search tools and create better search returns.249 Google
will remove a site from its listings if it uses misleading meta tags or hidden
text and links.250 Additionally, Google does not utilize meta tags or hidden
text in its Page Rank algorithms.251 As a result, it is not directly involved
in most meta tag lawsuits.
X. ANOTHER DUST-UP OVER CONTENT DISTRIBUTION
YouTube, a social media network for sharing video clips, has been
one of the more interesting acquisitions made by Google.252 Purchased in
2006, the site was regarded as a video equivalent of Napster: an innovative
technology, a cultural phenomenon, and a hotbed of copyright infringement.253 By March 2007, the film and television conglomerates had had
245. Google.com, Hidden Text and Links—Webmaster Tools Help,
http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=66353 (last visited
Aug. 14, 2009). [hereinafter Webmaster Tools] (explaining that text, such as excessive keywords,
can be hidden in several ways, including: using white text on a white background; including text
behind an image; using CSS to hide text; and setting the font size to zero).
246. See, e.g., N. Am. Med. Corp., 522 F.3d at 1212.
247. E.g., id. at 1222, 1224; Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 328 F.3d 1108, 1112
(9th Cir. 2003); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002).
248. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 803–04 (9th Cir. 2002) (meta tags accurately described content of former Playboy Playmate’s website). See also Faegre & Benson,
LLP v. Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1247 (D. Minn. 2005) (fair use for parody site); J.K. Harris
& Co. v. Kassel, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (fair use); Trans Union LLC v.
Credit Research, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1039–40 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (fair use).
249. See Anne Gilson LaLonde, It’s Still Unsafe to Use a Competitor’s Trademarks in
Your Meta Tags, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 2367 (2008).
250. Webmaster Tools, supra note 245.
251. See Vitaly Freidman, Google PageRank: What Do We Know About It?, SMASHING
MAGAZINE, June 5, 2007, http://www.smashingmagazine.com/2007/06/05/google-pagerankwhat-do-we-really-know-about-it/.
252. See YouTube.com, YouTube Fact Sheet, http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet (last
visited Mar 2, 2010).
253. See Jon Healey, Napster déjà vu?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, at M3; Chris Gaither,
Scaling the Heights, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2006, at C1.
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enough. Viacom International, Paramount Pictures and other plaintiffs
filed a lawsuit seeking to stop the unauthorized posting of broadcast content on YouTube.254
The copyright owners claimed to have “identified more than 150,000
unauthorized clips of their copyrighted programming on YouTube that had
been viewed an astounding 1.5 billion times.”255 There has never been any
factual dispute that at least tens of thousands of files have been uploaded to
YouTube without the copyright owners’ consent. The real question is
whether YouTube’s efforts have been sufficient under the take-down provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to provide it safe
harbor protection from liability.256 But given the increasingly close relations Google has developed with the broadcast industry and its continuing
attempt to serve as advertising distributor for television, the decision in the
dispute will be largely irrelevant to the long term evolution of video media
distribution.257
In the months following the initial filing of Viacom v. YouTube, a
number of agreements have been made involving licensed music videos
and other content on YouTube, changing the relationship among the litigants to that of business partners.258 For example, a website named
Vevo.com has been under development through a joint effort of YouTube
and Universal Music Group.259 Rather than serving to redefine market
dominance in the entertainment field for upcoming generations, this titanic
litigation is likely to merely shift money from one company to another,
based on historic business practices. The result will alter the influence each
litigant has at the bargaining table, but it will do little to shift the transition
in media relations among content producers, distributors, and consumers.
Nonetheless, the legal interpretation of the DMCA will have a significant impact on other intellectual property companies that rely on the safe
harbor provisions, and their efforts to comply. Section 512 of the Copyright Act creates a safe harbor for an Internet service provider which serves
to transmit Internet traffic, temporarily cache content on its system, or host
254. Complaint, supra note 191, at 3, 5.
255. Id.
256. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
257. See Jessica Guynn & Meg James, Google to Sell Ads for NBC, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9,
2008, at C1.
258. Adam Satariano & Brian Womack, Bono Plays Matchmaker as YouTube, Universal
Create Music Site, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 14, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aaEHAG7vyT94#.
259. Miguel Helft, With Advertising in Mind, YouTube and Universal Join to Create a
Hub for Music, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2009, at B3.
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content at the “direction of users.”260 The term “service provider means,
[inter alia], a provider of online services or network access. . . .”261 Although this definition is not particularly illuminating, it is likely to include
YouTube. YouTube serves as a host to the videos uploaded by the public.262 It provides tools to upload but does not edit or select content.263
As a result of its service provider function, YouTube will likely be
immune from monetary damages or injunctive relief if it does not have
knowledge of the infringing material posted by its users, does not gain a
direct financial benefit from the infringing activity, and takes expeditious
steps to remove the infringing material once it receives proper notice of the
infringement.264
Given the scale of unauthorized traffic on YouTube’s site, it is hard to
imagine that a jury would believe YouTube had no knowledge of infringing
activity. Indeed, like the facts in Napster, it may become clear that the bulk
of YouTube traffic was focused on copyrighted material, particularly popular television clips.265 YouTube acknowledges the significant copyright infringement on the site but counters that it has been diligent in responding to
notices to remove the infringing material, even when those notices did not
260. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
261. Id. at § 512(k)(1)(B).
262. See YouTube Fact Sheet, supra note 250, http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet (last
visited Mar. 2, 2010).
263. Id.
264. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2000)
(c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users.
(1) In general.—A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as
provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright
by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider—
(A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material
on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or
disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a
case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be
the subject of infringing activity.
See also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007).
265. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013 (“The record supports the district court's determination that as much as eighty-seven percent of the files available on Napster may be copyrighted
and more than seventy percent may be owned or administered by plaintiffs.”) (internal quotations
omitted).

468

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:429

necessarily meet the statutory requirements.266
YouTube has long said it removes such proprietary clips when
owners demand it, but [in October 2007] the company took a
more conciliatory stance. It announced a program under which
copyright holders can provide YouTube with advance copies of
their programming for identification purposes. Using new software, YouTube said, it can then automatically remove clips as
users post them.267
The scale of the problem faced by YouTube is enormous.268 Were
YouTube not in existence, there would be an even larger multitude of
video-hosting sites, increasing the burden on a copyright holder to police
the Internet.
The crux of the litigation will center on the extent to which the content owners can prove YouTube staff were “aware of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent.”269 Any quick search on YouTube will generate content that the copyright holders did not post.270 Type
in a song title and many different performances of the song will appear. In
such cases, not only does the copyright holder in the video have a copyright
infringement claim (against the unauthorized uploader, if no one else), but
in many cases, so do the composer and lyricist of the song.271
Google and YouTube continue to improve the technology to filter infringing content.272 Among the tens of thousands of files, there have undoubtedly been some notices that were misfiled and some removals that
were not expeditious. On the other hand, YouTube transformed itself from
a small viral company, building a business out of commercial copyrights, to
a dominant Internet Web host that actively polices content.273 YouTube
266. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2000); see also YouTube.com, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.youtube.com/fact_sheet (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
267. Thomas Mulligan, Viacom to Offer All Clips of ‘Daily Show’ Online, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 2008, at C1.
268. See, e.g., YouTube Law Fight ‘Threatens Net’, BBCNEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7420955.stm (last visited Mar. 12, 2010) (noting that Viacom alone identified over 150,000 unauthorized clips available on YouTube).
269. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(A)(ii) (2000).
270. See Layton & Strickland, supra note 55.
271. Unless the rights to perform the song on television included the rights to perform the
song on the Internet, the composer and lyricist have an independent cause of action.
272. See YouTube.com, YouTube Video Identification Beta,
http://www.youtube.com/t/video_id_about (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
273. See YouTube.com, YouTube Copyright Policy: Copyright Infringement Policy,
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=55772 ( last visited Mar.
9, 2010).
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will likely recognize that some of its value stemmed from the infringing activities of the company before it began working more closely with television and film companies.
XI. SITTING WITH COPYRIGHT ON ITS HEAD
What does the ubiquity of the unauthorized content on YouTube tell
us about copyright policy? Comparing the possible results in Viacom v.
YouTube with the provisions of the Google Book Search leads to an interesting insight about copyright—the rights are not that important. In a minority of cases, copyright owners actively police their highly valuable
rights, and in a few cases, thin-skinned artists may choose to over-police
those rights.274 In what seems to be the overwhelming majority of cases,
however, the copyright owners are comfortable allowing the unauthorized
materials to remain available, even when the only transaction cost is a simple take-down notice.275
The implications from the conduct of copyright owners engaged with
YouTube, the Google Book search, and other fora suggest that there may
be multiple norms for copyright. The incentive for the publisher of a
highly valuable work is to maximize the exploitation of that work. This
may be to control the distribution or simply to garner the revenue. For example, clips from “The Colbert Report” were pulled off YouTube, but
Comedy Central made them all available in an authorized manner on its
own site.276 For academic authors, out-of-print authors, and many other
artists, there may be a desire to give less than everything away while still
choosing not to enforce the legal rights available.
The end result is a copyright policy upside down from the 1976 Copyright Act.277 Copyright owners are expected to take the first step to object
to a posting on the Internet. If the objection is ignored, then the copyright
owner receives the support of the law. But the copyright owner can choose
not to act.278
274. See Margena A. Christian, Prince Continues His Purple Reign at 50, JET, June 23,
2008, at 60.
275. See Katie Allen, Google Seeks to Turn a Profit from YouTube Copyright Clashes,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Nov. 1, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/nov/01/googleyoutube-monetise-content.
276. Mulligan, supra, note 267.
277. See Gigi B. Sohn, Address at the New Media and the Marketplace of Ideas Conference at Boston University Collge of Communication: Six Steps to Digital Copyright Sanity: Reforming a Pre-VCR Law for a YouTube World (Oct. 26, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/gbsohn-speech-20071026.pdf).
278. Id. Contra Creative Commons, What is CC?,
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XII. SABOTAGE, ESPIONAGE, AND CENSORSHIP.CN
Perhaps the most salient example of the peculiar times facing Google
comes from China, which has been involved in controversies surrounding
the international Book Search Project, claims of computer hacking and espionage, censorship, Google’s refusal to sell into China, and a belated refusal to comply with local censorship laws.279 Google’s China story begins
with its launch of Google.cn.280 According to Google’s Chief Legal Officer, David Drummond, Google “launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the
belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in
China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to
censor some results.”281
The initial decision to provide Internet service to China, while knowing of the obligation to be complicit in censorship and surveillance of citizens, raises ethical issues that every company doing business internationally needs to acknowledge.282 This should not suggest that companies are
unethical for conducting such business. Google undertook the launch of
Google.cn mindful of the ethical tensions involved, and should be recognized for its open discourse regarding the challenging ethical dilemma.283
At the time, Google co-founder Sergey Brin noted the decision “compromised our principles.”284 So the decision to enter China, while not necessarily evil, was certainly an uncomfortable one.
http://creativecommons.org/about/what-is-cc (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (binding the copyright
owner to allow all third party uses in the manner specified by the license. The choice not to enforce the copyright has far less precedential value on the owner’s property interests than the
choice to adopt a particular Creative Commons license).
279. See generally Posting of David Drummond to the Official Google Blog, A New Approach to China, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html (Jan. 12,
2010, 15:00 EST).
280. See generally id.
281. Id. (“At the time we made clear that ‘we will carefully monitor conditions in China,
including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to
achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China.’”) (emphasis in original).
282. James Heffernan, An American in Beijing: An Attorney's Ethical Considerations
Abroad with a Client Doing Business with a Repressive Government, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
721, 723 (2006) (stating that a lawyer has a duty “not to advise the client to violate the law under
Model Rule 1.2(d) . . . [but] . . . under Model Rule 2.1 . . . could permit the attorney to compel the
client to follow human rights law by bringing other considerations to the client's attention”).
283. See KIRSTEN E. MARTIN, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE
ETHICS, CASE BRI-1004: GOOGLE, INC., IN CHINA 15 (2006), available at
http://www.darden.virginia.edu/corporate-ethics/pdf/BRI-1004.pdf.
284. Michael Sheridan, China's Great Internet Stand-Off, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), Jan.
17, 2010, at 8.
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Since then the situation has worsened. In December 2009, Google
and twenty or more U.S. companies were targeted with sophisticated cyber
attacks.285 Google and the U.S. State Department publicly suggested that
the Chinese government is to blame for the attacks, either directly or
through its tacit approval,286 noting that “a primary goal of the attackers
was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists.”287
Other reports suggest a broader array of targets including, “Northrop
Grumman, the US [defense] contractor; Dow, the chemicals giant; Adobe
Systems, the software firm; and an American law firm acting for Cybersitter, a firm pursuing a $2.2 billion lawsuit against China.”288 While these
targets may include dissidents, it is undoubtedly not the only goal of
China’s cyber attack policy. In fact, “Joel Brenner, former director of the
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, has identified China
as the origin point of extensive malicious cyber activities that target the
United States.”289 Comparing the attacks suffered in December with the
ongoing reports of China’s cyber-intrusions, it is unlikely that the goal was
merely to harass Chinese dissidents (though the likelihood that this was
part of the activity is certainly true enough).
The characterization of the motive for the attacks does not lessen the
precarious relationship between Beijing and Google—or Beijing and
Washington—nor does it take away the evidence of the very real threat
posed by the totalitarian regime. It does, however, suggest that Google
may want to depict its response as moral outrage rather than calculated
economics. Google’s economic exposure to China is presently calculated at
roughly five percent of its income, with revenues ranging from $300 to
$600 million.290 Google runs a distant second in the online search business
285. Drummond, supra note 279.
286. Nicholas Kralev, U.S. Seeks Explanation on Cyberattacks on Google, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2010, at A07 (“Both the administration and Google suggested that such a wellcoordinated and sophisticated attack could not have taken place without the government's knowledge.”).
287. Drummond, supra note 279.
288. Michael Sheridan, China’s Great Internet Stand-Off, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON),
Jan. 17, 2010, at 8.
289. U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMM’N, 111TH CONG., REPORT
TO CONG., 1st. Sess., at 167 (2009).
Cyber attacks that originate in China can defy easy classification; some malicious
activity appears to originate from private hacking groups, while other activity is
almost certainly state sponsored. The latter . . . can be recognized to a certain extent by two important factors. First, cyber incidents leave behind signatures that
can, with forensic analysis, sometimes reveal the affiliation of the responsible actors to a reasonable degree of certainty.
Id. at 169.
290. Kralev, supra note 284, at A07.
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to Baidu, which has seventy-five percent of the market compared to Google’s twenty percent.291
Once it adds the sales of its Android cellular phones, its potential
revenue and its potential exposure increase dramatically.292 As a result, one
of Google’s initial responses has been to delay the introduction of the Android phone operating system in China.293 Another of its responses has
been to eliminate censorship of Google.cn, which is a condition of its operations in China.294
Do these responses stem from Google’s moral outrage at the blatant
attacks on Chinese dissidents, or are they the business calculations of a
company threatened by trade secret theft and the potential risk of outright
sabotage?295 Increasingly, the analysis of the attack is focusing less on the
dissidents and more on the damage that may have been caused by the attacks and the potential for the attackers to have inserted their software code
into the operating software of the targets.296 Such code could create longterm security breaches or be used for later sabotage;297accordingly the
situation has worsened for Google and all U.S. content companies.298
291. James Temple, Google Says It Might Pull out of China, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 13, 2010,
at A1.
292. Analyst: Android Phone Sales to Grow Tenfold, REUTERS, May 11, 2009,
http://http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2346907,00.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
293. David Sarno, Google Phone Debut Put on Hold in China, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010,
at B3.
294. Temple, supra note 291, at A1.
295. See John Markoff & Ashlee Vance, Hackers Who Leave No Trace, N.Y. TIMES, Jan
20, 2010, at B1.
296. Id.
297. Id. At the same time, China is developing its own operating software, name Kylin,
which is resistant to cyber attacks that work on Linux, Unix and Windows based software; see
Bill Gertz, China Develops Operating System For ‘Cyber’ War, WASH. TIMES, May 18, 2009
(Nat’l Weekly), at 17.
298. Esther Dyson, chairperson for EDventure Holdings has written a fascinating analysis:
Of course, censorship is not a big secret in China. China employs approximately
30,000 people as censors. They have names and faces, and they may negotiate with
a publisher about a particularly sensitive topic. They are less likely to negotiate
with bloggers, because there are so many bloggers, but the government reportedly
does train bloggers in how to post in support of government policy, and if you are
lucky you can get a job (reportedly at $0.50 per post) doing the government's bidding.
So why has Google made a fuss and threatened to walk out of China? The answer
probably stems from a combination of—or rather, a changing calculus around—
business interests and values. The censorship issue has long grated at Google
(Brin, with his Russian background, is reported to be especially hostile to censorship), but the company could argue that transparency about censorship was better
than not serving China at all.
The censorship, however, has been getting worse. Perhaps the initial argument
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Google is engaged in a highly visible negotiation with the Chinese
government.299 If it shuts down its search engine, Google will claim an expensive but moral victory, while China will in fact achieve greater content
control over the Internet and greater market share for its national service.300
Ironically, shutting the Google search site then becomes a win-win solution
that may allow Google to continue some other operations in China free
from the moral dilemmas it now faces and confrontational position it now
holds.301 It may also be a strategic retreat given the challenges Google has
faced with Baidu over music search, cyber cafes, and staffing issues as well
as ongoing government interference.302
The strategy followed by Google is one previously adopted by Ya303
hoo! but not a viable one for Microsoft or Apple to follow. Yahoo! left
China, selling back its majority stake in Alibaba (though it retains a thirtynine percent ownership interest).304 Microsoft and Apple, Google’s real
competitors, both have significant software and hardware sales that make
their entanglement with China impossible to unwind.305 They face many of
the same hurdles as Google but stand to lose a much greater investment
were they to follow the moral high road being forged by Google.306 A
temporary retreat on search services may open the door to renew cellular
phone competition.
was wrong: Exposing Chinese censorship has done little to reduce it. Many Chinese support government censorship: They see it as a way to maintain civility and
order. They know that their government is fragile, and they consider criticism
harmful rather than cleansing. They trust their government to deal with problems
over time. . . .
Esther Dyson, The Google That Can Say No, DAILY NEWS EGYPT, Jan. 20, 2010, available at http://www.thedailynewsegypt.com/uncategorized/the-google-that-can-say-no.html.
299. See Miguel Helft, Google Hopes To Retain Business Unit In China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
20, 2010, at B4.
300. See id.
301. See generally id. (stating that most of Google’s revenue comes from advertising that
may not be affected).
302. See Andy Greenberg, The Guy Who's Beating Google, FORBES, Oct. 5, 2009, at 82
(discussing Robin Li the successful founder of Baidu).
303. See Sophie Taylor & Anupretta Das, Microsoft-Yahoo War May Spur Alibaba Buyback, REUTERS, Apr. 7, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSHA11084320080407.
304. See id.
305. Microsoft, for example, was found to violate a license agreement over Chinese character fonts originally licensed for Windows 95 and ordered to halt sales of newer versions of the
operating software. James Quinn, China Bans Microsoft From Selling Operating Systems, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Nov. 18, 2009, at 4.
306. See Nancy Gohring, Ballmer: Microsoft Will Stay in China, PCWORLD, Jan. 14,
2010,
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/186964/ballmer_microsoft_will_stay_in_china.ht
ml.
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Finally, the market may not be as clear cut as these assumptions suggest. Significant Chinese advertising funds are spent on the U.S. Google
site, revenue which is unlikely to be lost as a result of the change.307
Moreover, an increasingly large number of people living in countries with
Internet filtering are migrating to sophisticated software, virtual private
networks, proxy servers or similar tools that connect through other countries’ servers and thereby avoid the territorial limitations and the resulting
censorship.308 For those users, Google will likely continue to be a preferred
destination. Therefore, Google may risk less and have less to lose than its
blog suggests.309 In contrast, Microsoft and Apple have fewer such silver
linings to rationalize the coming thunder storm. If business is a race, then
slowing one’s opponent is almost as good as moving faster. Google remains the most nimble giant bestriding the Internet.
XIII. PREDICTIONS & CONCLUSION
Beyond the legal challenges, Google remains in a very competitive
fight with Microsoft for its ad revenue.310 The introduction of Bing may do
more to impact the Internet giants than any of the pending litigation. But
Google will not stand still. By next year, its search algorithm will have
been updated, and its new operating system launched.311 In the upcoming
environment, it is likely the corporate boards will be unlocked as the grappling intensifies. Google deserves to face antitrust scrutiny for its interlocking board memberships and the horizontal price fixing inherent in the
Google Book Search. The discussions over orphan works will continue,
hopefully with a more robust legislative solution, but orphan works will not
307. Tony D'Altorio, Google's Failure in China. . . Revisited, DAILY MARKETS, Mar. 4,
2010, http://www.dailymarkets.com/stocks/2010/03/04/google%E2%80%99s-failure-inchina%E2%80%A6-revisited.
308. Dan Levin, Software Finds Profit In Bypassing Censors, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE,
Jan. 16, 2010, at 3 (“More than a million people in China, including human rights activists and
expatriates, are using special software to circumvent the nation's complex online censorship system, known as the ‘Great Firewall’ . . . capitalizing on the growing desire of China's Internet users to fanqiang, or scale the wall . . . .”).
309. Drummond, supra note 279.
310. See David Needle, Ballmer Happy With Bing's Progress, INTERNET NEWS, Mar. 2,
2010,
http://www.internetnews.com/search/article.php/3868116/Ballmer+Happy+With+Bings+Progress
.htm.
311. Posting of Sundar Pichai & Linus Upson to the Official Google Blog, Introducing the
Google Chrome OS, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/07/introducing-google-chrome-os.html
(July 7, 2009, 21:37 EST); Cade Metz, Google Research Head Dubs Holy PageRank 'OverHyped', THE REGISTER, Mar. 3, 2010, available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/03/03/google_research_head_norvig_on_pagerank.
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derail the settlement.312 The benefits to Google of having immunity from
suit by a group of parties that cannot be identified will not be the antitrust
barrier to the Google Book Search. Despite legitimate antitrust concerns,
the trajectory of the company remains that of a fierce competitor in a challenging market. Google’s copyright liability for YouTube and the Google
Book Search will continue to be matters of great speculation, but neither
will have significant impacts on the company or copyright law. International issues will trouble Google, but these concerns are endemic to all U.S.
software companies.313 They may preclude success in particular territories,
but they will not threaten to undermine the company more broadly.
Only in the area of trademark law is Google vulnerable. The sale of
advertising and promotion of keywords lies at the heart of Google’s revenue stream. The sale of trademarks in its AdWords program will continually grow as a source of liability for the company in the U.S. and around
the world. Google and other search companies will be compelled to stop
trading in the trademarks of others. To the extent that the use of trademarks improve advertising sales rather than merely change where the advertising dollars are spent, the change could cost Google significant revenue.
Google has charted its course as an advertising company and it remains one. It will continue to explore new ways to deliver content that it
can use to market its advertising, but it will not transform itself into a software company. The real question is whether, in an age of “free,” more and
more competitors are becoming advertising companies as well. Does Google deserve special treatment for its commitment not to be evil? If the
standard is a comparison to its direct competitors, then it has failed. Google, along with Apple and Microsoft, provides valuable products and services, but in a tenacious, competitive manner. Google is no more—and no
less—evil than the others.

312. Andrew Albanese, Debate Over Google Settlement Continues As Hearing Draws
Near, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Feb. 12, 2010, http://www.publishersweekly.com/article/449124Debate_Over_Google_Settlement_Continues_as_Hearing_Draws_Near.php.
313. See Dan Levin, New Scrutiny on Censorship Issues for U.S. Companies in China,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/technology/02internet.html?pagewanted=all (“Amazon and
other U.S. companies doing business in China are coming under new scrutiny from politicians
and human rights groups since Google’s recent announcement that it planned to stop adhering to
government demands that it censor search results in China and perhaps would pull out of the
country . . . . So far Microsoft, Yahoo and Google have signed on to the voluntary code of conduct, but whether they will adhere to it remains uncertain.”).

